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Florida law governing adoption' affords the adoptee, whether infant or
adult,2 all the rights of a person born to the adoptive parents in lawful wedlock. The law of intestate succession, however, ensures distinctions between
adopted and natural issue contrary to legislative intent regarding adoption3
By adhering to the traditional view that consanguinity governs intestate
succession, Florida courts have interpreted Florida statutes to restrict the inheritance right of adoptees to inherit from the adoptive family, yet have
maintained the full right of inheritance from the natural family.4 This
means that the adoptee has no right to inherit from any kindred of the
adopter unless the statutory language is dearly to that effect. However,
inheritance by adopted persons within the natural family is discriminatorily
curtailed by statute in accordance with the circumstances of birth. For
* B.A. 1957, Yale University; J.D. 1960, Boston University; Professor of Law, University
of Florida.
-0 B.A. 1965, M.A.T. 1966, University of Florida; Candidate for J.D. 1973, University
of Florida.
1. "Adoption" has been defined as: "The act of one who takes another's child into
his own family, treating him as his own, and giving him all the rights and duties of his
own child.... A juridical act creating between two persons certain relations, purely civil,
of paternity and filiation." BLAcK's LAw DicrIONARY 70 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
2. Under Florida law a single or married adult may adopt another adult, provided the
adopter is more than ten years older than the adoptee. FLA. STAT. §63.241 (1969). However,
it was held in First Nat!l Bank v. Mott, 101 Fla. 1124, 133 So. 78 (1931), that under
Florida statutes an adult married woman could not be adopted in order to make her the
heir of the adopters. While this case did not involve wife- or husband-adoption, a problem
is present in this area, since adults can now be adopted. Interplay would be involved among
FLA. STAT. §§63.241, .061, 741.21, .22 (1969). In this respect compare Bedinger v. Graybill's
Executor, 302 S.W.2d (Ky. 1957), with Pennington v. Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co.,
390 S.W.2d 671 (Ky. 1965). See Note, Ability of Legatee-Husband to Adopt Wife To Bring
Her Within Terms of Will, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 97.
3. The Florida situation is not unique, however. "Although legitimate natural children
are preferred takers in all states, adopted children and illegitimate children create additional problems for the inheritance system. Adoption in the sense of creating a legal
relationship of parent and child was not part of the English common law. The first
American adoption statute was passed in Massachusetts in 1851. Its purpose was to provide
the needy child with parents and a home, rather than to furnish the adopter with an heir.
Today all states have adoption statutes. However, provisions related to inheritance are
secondary, varied, and in many instances inadequate." M. SuSSMAN, J. CAT.Es & D. SmrrH,
THE FAMmY AND INHERrrANCE 20 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
4. See, e.g., In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 141-43, 13 So. 2d 904, 905-06 (1943).
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instance, inheritance rights of the legitimate person 5 differ from those of
the illegitimate,6 while the status of the artificial insemination issue is
unresolved. These varied succession rights raise questions of equal protection of the laws as applied to the adoptee. Further, succession by adoptees
within the natural family is hindered by the requirement that a court order
be obtained before adoption records may be unsealed.7 Additional statutory
problems are: adoption and inheritance of dual portions," succession rights
after successive adoptions, inheritance rights of natural parents who intermarry with adoptive parents, and the adoptee as a pretermitted heir. Since
Florida case law is limited and Florida statutes are silent or ambiguous in
certain areas of crucial importance, a pragmatic legislative solution is a
necessary and immediate priority.
BACKGROUND

Although adoption was well known in Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and
other ancient cultures9 it did not gain legal recognition in England and the
United States until relatively recent times,o being first recognized in the
latter. The common law of England did not recognize adoption" and confined intestate transmission to blood relatives of the decedent. 12 Absent
a unifying common law background, American law developed different approaches to adoption and the adoptee's succession rights. 1 3 Until recently,

however, case decisions were in agreement on one point-the adoptee's intestate inheritance rights within the adoptive family should be severely
restricted, if allowed at all. This view stemmed from the common law rule
14
that required consanguinity for intestate succession.

5.
6.

See FLA. STAT. §731.23 (1969).
See FLA. STAT. §731.29 (1969).

7. FLA. STAT. §63.181 (1969).
8. Inheritance of dual portions refers to the ability of an adoptee to inherit in more
than one capacity from the same decedent. See In re Benner's Estate, 109 Utah 172, 166
P.2d 257 (1946).
9. Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REv. 743, 743-49
(1956); Note, The Law of Adoption, 22 CoLua. L. REv. 332, 332-33 (1922).
10. "The earliest adoption statute in the United States is variously reported to be
that of Mississippi in 1846 and Massachusetts in 1851." See Huard, supra note 9, at 748.
11. Hockaday v. Lynn, 200 Mo. 456, 461, 98 S.W. 585, 585 (1906); T. ATKINSON, WILLS
§23, at 86 (2d ed. 1953).
12. Note, Property Rights as Affected by Adoption, 25 BROOKLYN L. REv. 231 (1959).
A statute legalizing adoptions was passed in England in 1926. The Adoption of Children
Act, 16 & 17 Geo. v, c. 29 (1926). For an earlier English view toward adoption see 17
HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND §260 (1st ed. 1911).

13. The variety of jurisdictional approaches to the inheritance rights of an adoptee is
collected in Note, supra note 12.
14. "From time immemorial it has been held by English-speaking peoples that the
property of intestate deceased persons should descend to kindred of the blood. This is not
a conclusion arrived at by application of principles of logic, but it is a tenet of justice,
intuitively and generally recognized, and crystallized into forms of law by common consent."
In re Bradley's Estate, 185 Wis. 393, 395, 201 N.W. 973, 974 (1925). See In re Hewett's
Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 142, 13 So. 2d 904, 907 (1943).
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The many arguments supporting this "traditional" approach are in
essence variations of the English "blood of blood-bone of bone" view of
intestate succession transposed into the modern concept of adoption. 15 For
example, many courts articulate the "imposing an heir" theory to allow
the adoptee to inherit from no adoptive family members other than the
parents. Inheritance from other members of the adopting family is prohibited, for "[b]y adoption, the adopters can make for themselves an heir,
but they cannot thus make one for their kindred."'16 The "imposing an heir"
tenet is basically the "blood of blood-bone of bone" archetype of intestate
succession and is used to maintain the adoptee's link with his natural
(blood) kindred. The Supreme Court of Florida has indicated approval of
17
the policy underlying this concept:
The ancestors of the adopter are presumed to know their relatives
by blood, and to have them in mind in the distribution of their estates,
either by will or descent, but they cannot be expected to keep informed as to adoption proceedings in the probate courts of the
counties of this state; and to allow an adopted child to inherit from
the ancestors of the adopter would often put property into the hands
of unheard of adopted children, contrary to the wishes and expectations of such ancestors.
States following the traditional approach strictly construe adoption statutes
that are in derogation of inheritance rights based on blood relationships,,
and often justify the results by impressing the adoption proceedings with
aspects of a contractual relationship. 1 The main premise of this theory is
that the adoption "agreement" binds only the "parties," the natural and
adoptive parents.20 Since the adoptee is not a party to the contract, its terms
may not be extended to abrogate the adoptee's natural rights of inheritance.2 '
The reasoning of the traditionalists is also given impetus by the argument

15.

See Huard, supra note 9, at 745-46; Note, supra note 12, at 231-32.

16. See In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 13 So. 2d 904 (1943); Warren v. Prescott, 84
Me. 483, 487, 24 A. 948, 949 (1892).
17. In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 143, 13 So. 2d 904, 907 (1943), quoting Phillips
v. McConica, 59 Ohio St. 1, 9, 51 N.E. 445, 447 (1898).
18. See In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 143, 13 So. 2d 904, 907 (1943); In re Levy's
Estate, 141 So. 2d 803, 805 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1962); In re Bradley's Estate, 185 Wis. 393, 396,
201 N.W. 973, 974 (1925).
19. See, e.g., Merritt v. Morton, 143 Ky. 133, 135, 136 S.W. 133, 134 (1911).
20. Id.
21. "The act of the foster parents in adopting the child is a contract into which they
entered with those having the lawful custody of the child, an agreement personal to themselves, and, while they have a perfect right to bind or obligate themselves to make the
child their heir, they are powerless to extend this right on his part to inherit from others.
All inheritance laws are based or built upon natural ties of blood relationship, whereas
an adopted child's right to inherit rests upon a contract, and hence only those parties
to the contract are bound by it." Id. See Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Brown, 152 Me. 360, 131
A.2d 191, 195 (1957).
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that the adoptee's right to inherit from his blood kindred should be preserved, since he has "lost the benefit of living with his blood parents, a
22
benefit widely recognized as a very real advantage."
The modern trend, now followed by the majority of American jurisdictions, has rejected intestate succession rights based upon blood kinship
with the adoptee.23 The growing tendency is to consummate a new family
relationship by legally withdrawing the adoptee from the natural family and
placing him for all purposes, including inheritance, as a child born in lawful
wedlock within the adoptive family.2 4 The modernists point out that early
American decisions upholding the "blood of blood-bone of bone" tenet were
based on intuition and not on logic, which, therefore, casts doubt on the
inviolability of this mode of succession.25 As there was no common law of
adoption in England, American courts have misapplied the precedential
value of succession rights cast in terms of blood relationships in the adoptee
situation. The proponents of the new trend contend that statutes inter22. Comment, Adoption: Twice Adopted Child as Heir of First Adopter, 3 U. Fla.
L. Rev. 237, 238 (1950). "An additional right on the purely material side helps in some
measure to offset this loss." Id. This view may be compared with numerous cases upholding
the adoption of a child as being in the adoptee's best interest although contested by one
or both of the natural parents. See Hamilton v. Rose, 99 So. 2d 234 (Fla. 1957); In re
Adoption of Long, 56 So. 2d 450 (Fla. 1952); In re Adoption By Cooper, 242 So. 2d 196
(Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1970); In re Adoption of Vincent, 219 So. 2d 454 (Ist D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
23. Until recently, the majority of American jurisdictions adhered to the traditional
view of adoption and intestate succession. See T. ATKNSON, supra note 11, §23, at 86-92.
However, at least thirty-one jurisdictions have enacted statutes to completely sever the
adoptee from his natural blood kindred, for all purposes including intestate succession,
and to place the adoptee within the adoptive family as a natural child of his adoptive
parent (s). Such statutes generally make exceptions ifa natural and adoptive parent intermarry or if there is a will or written contractual agreement to the contrary. These jurisdictions are ALASKA STAT. §20.10.120 (1971); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §8-117 (Supp. 1971);
CAL. PROBATE CODE §257 (West 1957); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. §153-2-4 (1964); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §45-65 (1960); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §920 (1953); D.C. CODE ENCYCr- ANN.
§16-312 (1966); HAWAII REv. LAWS §578-16 (1968); IND. ANN. STAT. §§3-120a(3), -122
(1968), as amended, (Supp. 1971); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §199.520 (1971); LA. CIV. CODE

ANN. art. 214 (West Supp. 1972); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §78 (1966), as amended, (Supp.
1971), art. 93, §1-207 (1969); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, §§7-9 (Supp. 1971); MINN. STAT.
§259.29 (1971); Miss. CODE ANN. §1269.06 (1971); Mo. ANN. STAT. §453.090 (1969); MONT.
REV. CODE ANN. §61-212 (1970); NEB. REv. STAT. §§43-110 to 111.01 (1968); NEV. REV. STAT.

§127.160 (1957); N.J. REv. STAT. §9:3-30 (Supp. 1971); N.M. STAT. ANN. §22-2-33 (Supp.
1971); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW §117 (McKinney Supp. 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§29-17, 48-23
(Supp. 1971); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §3107.13 (Supp. 1971); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§60.16 (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT. tit. 1, §321 (Supp. 1971); S.C. CODE §10-2587.13 (Supp.
1971); TENN. CODE ANN. §36-126 (Supp. 1971); VA. CODE ANN. §§63.1-233 to 244 (Supp.
1971); W. VA. CODE ANN. §48-4-5 (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. §851.51 (1971). Georgia follows

the modern majority except that the adoptive family does not inherit from the adoptee the
property that he received from his natural family. GA. CODE ANN. §74-414 (Supp. 1971).
24. For jurisdictions in the Fifth Circuit adhering to the majority view see GA. CODE
ANN. §74-414 (Supp. 1971); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 214 (Supp. 1972); Miss. CODE ANN.
§1269.06 (1971).
25. That intuition, not logic, was the foundation for the adoptee's intestate succession
rights was conceded in an early American case upholding the traditional view. See In re
Bradley's Estate, 185 Wis. 393, 201 N.W. 973, 974 (1925). See also note 14 supra.
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rupting the flow of inheritance rights based on blood relationships, such as
intestate inheritance from and by one's spouse or the kindred of one's spouse,
26
are not novel and are commonly accepted throughout the United States.
Furthermore, the reasoning that one may not impose an heir by adoption
on one's kindred is impaired by the fact that heirs may be created by biological means as easily, if not more so, than by adoption.2 7 Moreover, the
material benefits derived from the adoptee's natural parents are in most
instances negligible, since the majority of adopted children, other than
those adopted by blood relatives, are illegitimate or come from poor families. 2 8 Additionally, the argument that adoptees' intestate rights should
remain anchored in consanguinity to compensate for deprivation of natural
parentage is of limited merit. 29 Many states still, however, restrict intestate
30
succession rights of illegitimates to inheritance from the mother.

26. See, eg., FLA. STAT. §731.23 (1969). Florida, while adhering to the "blood of blood"
concept of intestate succession, gives a novel twist to this approach. Although Florida allows
the spouse (non-blood relation) to take by intestacy, FLA. STAT. §731.30 (1969) abrogates
inheritance by blood parents from their natural child who has been adopted. Since the
parent-child relationship is one of the most fundamental, it has been held that a statute
extinguishing the right of natural parents to inherit from the adoptee severs the entire
foundation connecting blood relatives with the adoptee. In re Fodor, 202 Misc. 11-3, 117
N.Y.S.2d 331, 334 (Sur. Ct. 1952).
27. Although dealing with the anti-lapse statute and its effect on the adoptee, the
court in In re Baker's Estate, 172 So. 2d 268 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1965), noted a simple expedient
to this problem. If a family member wants only blood kindred to share in his estate he
may make a will to that effect. Id. at 271; see In re Cave's Estate, 326 Pa. 358, 366, 192
A. 460, 464 (1937). Yet, under the traditional approach the natural child has an advantage
over the adopted child. If a successor under intestacy legislation, he stands to inherit
through his parents unless expressly excluded by virtue of the fact that the deceased family
member died with a will. The adopted child, on the other hand, generally has no more
right than a stranger to be included by will. An unfair burden is placed on the adoptee,
for not everyone makes a will even though able to do so. People are great procrastinators
when it comes to will making. Reasons may vary from the idiosyncratic, for example, a
belief that making a will brings bad luck, to an honest but mistaken belief that none
was needed due to insuffident property ownership. See M. SUSSMAN, J. GATEs & D. SMTrrH,
supra note 3, at 203.
28. Note, A Re-evaluation of Inheritance and Testamentary Rights with Respect to
Adopted Children in Wisconsin, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 504, 506. According to the FLOamA
DEP'T

OF

HEALTH

&

REHABILrrATIVE

SERVICES,

DIVISION

OF

FAMILY

SERVICES

ADOPTION

(1970), 324 adoptees were born in wedlock, 114 were of unknown
origin, and 2858 (87%) were born out of wedlock in 1970.
29. Of the adoptions occurring in 1970, 87% of the adoptees were placed with families
having an income of $6,000 and above. FLORIDA DEP'T OF HEALTH & REHABIATIVE SERVICES,
supra note 28. It could be argued that a "station in life" rule is applicable and once an
adoption is finalized the adoptee's tastes and standard of living are molded according to
the economic situation of the adoptive family. Thus, his inheritance rights should be
related to this "station in life" to which he has become accustomed.
30. For example, FLA. STAT. §731.29 (1969) allows the illegitimate to inherit from his
mother and, if recognized in a witnessed writing by the father, he is the heir of such
father. However, unless the parents have intermarried the illegitimate does not represent
his father or mother by inheriting any part of the estate of his natural parents' kindred.
STATISTICAL REPORT 1
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A final theory of the modernists is that descent and distribution statutes
are designed to achieve an orderly, fair, and just disposition of property
in accordance with the surmised dispositive wishes of the decedent. 31 The
adoptee often lives from earliest memory in the adoptive family's environment, and the circumstances of his origin often remain secret. 32 The adoptee
normally assumes the interests and personality of his adoptive family and is
considered a natural part of the adoptive family. Thus, the purposes of
descent and distribution statutes are best served by treating the child as
a natural member of the adoptive family.3 3 Since it is state policy to foster
adoptions, 34 any compromise that leaves the adopted child tied to two
families and precludes inheritance as a natural child within the adoptive
family prevents the existence of the true family relationship sought by the
family, the adoption agency, and the state.
The authors submit that the modernists' approach is the correct one.
The thesis of this article is that upon adoption, the adoptee, for inheritance
purposes, should be completely transplanted into the family of his adopting
parents and there should be succession by, from, and through the adoptee
and the adopting parents.
It is the authors' purpose to analyze existing Florida law in order -to
indicate whether the adoptee is a "second class citizen" for inheritance
purposes. Constructive criticism of defective legislation will be made with
the hope and expectation that reform of deficiencies will result in the future.
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF FLORIDA ADOPTION AND

INTESTATE SuccEssIoN LAWS
There are several statutes governing adoption in Florida.35 The most
important, with respect to intestate inheritance rights of adoptees, are
3
Florida Statutes, section 731.30, which begins: 1

31.

For discussion of this modern view see In

re Smith's Estate, 7 Utah 2d 405, 326

P.2d 400 (1958).
32. Under a prefiled bill in the Florida Legislature not only are the records of all
adoption proceedings to be kept confidential, but a new birth certificate for an adoptee
under 12 years of age may be issued to the adopting parents. Fla. H.R. 2856 (Feb. 2, 1972).
33. Note, supra note 28, at 510-11.
34. FLA. STAT. §63.011 (1969); Note, The Effect of Common Law Rights of Parents on
Adoption in Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 452, 462 (1963).
35. FA. STAT. §§63.011-.291, 409.145-.165, 731.10-.11, .20 (1969). Florida's first adoption
statute was passed in 1885 although adoption was allowed prior to this time by special
legislative enactment. See Fla. Laws 1885, ch. 3594, 1883, chs. 3543-3555.
36. The full text of FLA. STAT. §731.30 (1969) is: "Adopted child. An adopted child,
whether adopted under the laws of Florida or of any other state or country, shall be an
heir at law, and for the purpose of inheritance, shall be regarded as a lineal descendant of
his adopting parents and the adopting parents shall inherit from the adopted child. The
adopted child shall be regarded as the natural brother or sister of the natural children
and other adopted children of the adopting parents for the purpose of inheritance from
or by them. The adopted child shall inherit from the estate of his blood parents, but
his blood parents shall not inherit from the adopted child."
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An adopted child, whether adopted under the laws of Florida or of
any other state or county, shall be an heir at law, and for the purpose
of inheritance shall be regarded as a lineal descendant of his adopting
parents ... .
37
and Florida Statutes, section 63.151, which begins:

By any judgment or decree of adoption the child shall be the child
and legal heir of the adopting parent or parents, entitled to all rights
and privileges, and subject to all obligations, of a child born to such
parent or parents in lawful wedlock."
The statutory language seems to place the adoptee within the foster
family as a natural child of his adopting parents. A reasonable extension
would apply Florida Statutes, section 731.23, specifying the mode of intestate
succession for relatives by blood or marriage, to allow inheritance between
the adoptee and the full range of his adoptive kindred. These statutes
through judicial construction, however, have been determined to mean:
(1) the adoptee inherits from all his natural (blood) kindred including his natural parents; 38
(2) all the natural (blood) kindred except the natural parents inherit from the adoptee; 39
(3) within the adoptive family, intestate succession is strictly limited
to inheritance by and from the adoptee, his adoptive parents, and the
natural and adopted children of the adoptive parents. The adoptee may
not inherit by intestacy from any other adoptive kindred.-

37. The full text of FLA. STAT. §63.151 (1969) is: "Effect of adoption. By any judgment or decree of adoption the child shall be the child and legal heir of the adopting
parent or parents, entitled to all rights and privileges, and subject to all obligations, of
a child born to such parent or parents in lawful wedlock. After the adoption the natural
parents, if living, are relieved of all legal duties and obligations due from them to the
child and are divested of all rights with respect to the child, but when the adopting parent
is married to one of the natural parents of the child or thereafter intermarries with one
of the natural parents, the relation of the child toward the natural parents is not
altered by the adoption. When an adopted child has been subsequently adopted by some
third party or readopted by his natural parents or one of them, the adopted child shall
not inherit from an adopted parent when he has been subsequently adopted by another
or by his natural parents or one of them in the absence of some evidence in writing that
the adopting parent considered the child his child for the purposes of inheritance notwithstanding the subsequent adoption. Nothing in this law shall prevent a legally adopted
child from inheriting from the natural parents under the laws of this state or any state."
Florida Statutes, §63.281, is a separate provision relating to adult adoptees, which incorporates much of §§63.151 and 731.30.
38. See FLA. STAT. §§63.151, .281, 731.30 (1969). See also In re Levy's Estate, 141 So. 2d
803, 805-06 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
39. See FLA. STAT. §§63.151, 731.30 (1969). See also In re Levy's Estate, 141 So. 2d 803,
804-05 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
40. In re Poole's Estate, 152 Fla. 610, 611, 15 So. 2d 323, 324 (1943); In re Hewett's
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Thus, despite statutory language to the contrary, the Florida judiciary has
adhered to the traditional "blood of blood-bone of bone" view of succession,
thereby generating a hybrid complex of inheritance rights that stigmatize
the adoptee as a second-class citizen.
The effect of present Florida adoption laws on intestate succession may
be understood by analyzing three prominent decisions. 41 In 1943 the supreme
court, in In re Hewett's Estate,42 held that an adopted child of a deceased
first cousin of the intestate was unable to participate with collateral blood
kindred in the intestate's property. The court construed the applicable
statute4 3 to allow the adoptee to inherit within the adoptive family from
the adoptive parents only. 4" Therefore, the adoptee is not an heir at law or
lineal descendant of the adopting parents for purposes of inheriting from
lineal or collateral kindred of the adopting parents. 4 5 The lower court had
construed the statute to mean the adoptee was placed for inheritance purposes in the same position as a natural child of the adoptive parents. 46 The
supreme court, however, declined to allow the adoptee to inherit from other
than those adoptive relatives specifically enumerated in the statute, and held
that "descendants" was a word connoting only those persons who were in the
blood stream of the ancestors. 47 Since the statute did not expressly make the
adoptee the heir at law or lineal descendant of anyone other than the adopting parents, the supreme court stated: "[W]e cannot add anything to the
statute which is not expressly stated therein or which is not necessarily
implied by the language used. "4s

This tenacious adherence to the traditional view basing intestate succession on blood ties produced a curious result in another 1943 supreme
court decision. In In re Poole's Estate4 9 tile issue was whether the estate of
an adoptee dying intestate would devolve to his adoptive first cousins or to
the next of kin of his previously deceased wife. Under Florida intestate

Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 141-43, 13 So. 2d 904, 906-07 (1943); FLA. STAT. §731.30 (1969).
41. The first Florida supreme court case in the area of adoption was not decided until
1937. In re Palmer's Adoption, 129 Fla. 630, 176 So. 537 (1937). Since there is a paucity
of case law on this subject, legislative change in the adoptee's rights of intestate succession

may be accomplished without the abridgment of long-standing vested rights.
42. 153 Fla. 137, 13 So. 2d 904 (1943).
43. FLA. STAT. §731.30 (1969), formerly Fla. Probate Act of 1933, §31: "An adopted child
* . .shall be an heir at law, and for the purpose of inheritance, shall be regarded as a
lineal descendant of his adopting parents, and the adopting parents shall inherit from the
adopted child." Id.
44. 153 Fla. at 141, 13 So. 2d at 906. Although not under consideration by the Hewett
court, the adoptee may also inherit from the natural and adoptive brothers and sisters of
his adopting parents. FLA. STAT. §731.30 (1969).
45. 153 Fla. at 142, 13 So. 2d at 907.
46. Id. at 140, 13 So. 2d at 906. The lower court also noted the statutory phrase "for
the purpose of inheritance" was not qualified by words such as "from its adopting
parents alone," and therefore the term "inheritance" should be used in its unrestricted
sense. Id.
47. 153 Fla. at 142, 13 So. 2d at 907.
48. Id. at 140, 13 So. 2d at 906.
49. 153 Fla. 610, 15 So. 2d 323 (1943).
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succession law, the next of kin of a predeceased spouse inherit only when all
maternal and paternal kindred of the intestate are non-existent. 50 The court,
however, held the deceased wife's kindred inherited to the exclusion of the
intestate's adoptive first cousins. 5x Thus, the hybrid character of the adoptee's
status was further accentuated by excluding adoptive family members from
participation in the adoptee's estate in favor of those who had neither a blood
nor an adoptive relationship with the adoptee. In fact, the rationale of the
Poole's Estate case can be logically carried to the extreme. If an adoptee died
survived by no blood kin (other than parents), spouse or in-laws, and no
adoptive kin closer in relationship than brothers and sisters his estate would
52
pass to the state of Florida by escheat.
The third important decision is In re Levy's Estate.53 In issue was whether
a child adopted out of his natural family could nevertheless inherit from
his natural brothers and sisters. Although Florida Statutes, section 731.30,
is silent on the subject, 54 the court upheld the right of adoptees to inherit
from natural siblings and stated:55
The adoption statutes give new rights to adoptees. They do not, however, attempt to limit or take away rights already in existence with the
exception that the natural parent may not inherit from his natural
child who has been adopted.
In contrast to the Hewett court, which refused to add anything not expressly stated or necessarily implied by the statute, 56 the Levy court interpreted
the statute's silence on the adoptee's right to inherit from his natural kindred
to mean that the adoptee inherits from the full range of his blood relatives. 57
One interesting observation should be emphasized here. It is submitted
that there is the legal right of dual inheritance vis-a-vis all of the brothers
and sisters of the adoptee. Florida Statutes, section 731.30, states in part:
"The adopted child shall be regarded as the natural brother or sister of the
natural children and other adopted children of the adopting parents for
the purpose of inheritance from or by them." Levy indicates that there may
be inheritance from or by siblings in the natural family. Hypothetically, an
adoptee could die survived by five brothers in the adoptive family and five
sisters in the natural family. Under intestacy all would share the estate
equally,' one-tenth each.

50.
51.

52.
53.

§731.23 (7) (1969).
153 Fla. at 611, 15 So. 2d at 324.
See FLA. STAT. §731.33 (1969).
141 So. 2d 803 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1962).
FLA. STAT.

54. FLA. STAT. §731.30 covers only inheritance from adopting parents, natural parents,
and children of the adopting parents.
55. 141 So. 2d at 804.
56. See In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 140, 13 So. 2d 904, 906 (1943).
57. 141 So. 2d at 806. The court did not determine if under the statutory language
the brothers and sisters in the adoptive family inherit to the exclusion of or equally with
the adoptee's natural brothers and sisters. See FLA. STAT. §731.30 (1969).
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In summary, although Florida Statutes, section 731.30, states that an adoptee
shall be regarded as a lineal descendant of his adoptive parents for the purpose of inheritance, and Florida Statutes, section 63.151,Ss states that an
adoptee shall be entitled to all the rights of a child born to the adoptive
parents, Florida courts have adhered to the traditional view of intestacy,
holding blood ties supreme over de facto ties of family relation, unless
specified to the contrary by statute. In view of the decisions it appears that
Florida law will continue to be construed to preclude inheritance between
the adoptee and the full range of his adoptive relatives, in spite of contrary
statutory language, 9 It is, therefore, time for the Florida Legislature to make
clear its intent with an explicit, comprehensive statute.
FLORIDA ADOPTION LAW INCONSISTENCIES

Confidentiality of Records
Florida decisions evince the belief that Florida Statutes, section 731.30,
is extremely generous to adoptees by augmenting their inheritance rights
beyond those of persons nurtured in the natural family.- However, when
viewed realistically in conjunction with other Florida adoption statutes, the
so-called "liberality" inherent in Florida Statutes, section 731.30, is nonexistent. While the courts maintain that the adoptee inherits from the full
range of his blood relatives, a statute requires all adoptive records to be kept
confidential. 61 To foster successful adoption relationships, the real name and
place of birth of the adoptee may not be given to the adopting parents if
the adoptee has been committed to a child placement agency.6 2 After entry
of the adoption decree by the circuit court, the files and adoption records
are sealed. 63 Such records may not be reopened unless a court order is obtained.64 Furthermore, under the procedures employed by the State Department of Public Welfare, which must supervise all Florida adoptions, 65
58. This statute was enacted as Fla. Laws 1943, ch. 41759, at 181-87. The supreme
court in both In re Hewett's Estate and In re Poole's Estate ignored this currently enacted
legislation that had been approved by the Governor on May 17, 1943, and filed with the
secretary of state the next day. Although under the 1885 Florida constitution (art. III, §18)
it did not become law until sixty days after the legislature adjourned, this bill provided
insight as to the legislative meaning and intent concerning inheritance rights of the
adopted child. In re Hewett's Estate (June 8, 1943) and In re Poole's Estate (Oct. 22,
1943) were both decided subsequent to this enactment.
59. See Korbin v. Ginsberg, 232 So. 2d 417, 418 (4th D.C.A. Fla. 1970), for statement
inferring that the adoptee has the same rights as a natural child of his adopting parents.
See also Gessner v. Powell, 238 So. 2d 101, 102 (Fla. 1970).
60. See, e.g., In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 141-42, 13 So. 2d 904, 906-07 (1943).
"This statute is very liberal in its provisions in behalf of the adopted child. Such child
inherits from its adopting parents as if it were their own natural child, and likewise inherits from its natural parents." Id.
61. FLA. STAT. §63.181 (1969).
62. FLA. STAT. §63.071 (1) (1969).
63. FLA. STAT. §63.181 (1969).
64. Id.
65. FLA. STAT. §63.011 (1969). The Department of Public Welfare is also charged with
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a new birth certificate may be issued to the adopting parents and their names
substituted for those of the natural parent (s).66 Thus, the Florida statutes
and the State Department of Public Welfare policies are designed to prevent
the adoptee or his natural kindred from identifying each other. The Florida
adoption laws both promote litigation by requiring a court order before
the names of the natural parents will be divulged,6 7 and effectively limit the
adoptee's intestate succession rights to the estate of his adoptive parents and
his adoptive siblings because of the difficulty of ascertaining natural relatives.68 Contrary to the views expressed in Hewett and Levy, 9 the bond between the adoptee and his natural family for inheritance purposes is in
most instances little more than an empty legal right.
The Legitimate Adoptee
The statutory veil of secrecy surrounding adoption is only the first
obstacle the adoptee must surmount in order to obtain the inheritance rights
Florida courts have maintained are his by law. Although by statute the
adoptee is the legitimate issue of his adoptive parents,-0 his succession rights
within the blood family are tied to the circumstances of his birth before the
adoption. These inheritance rights vary greatly according to the circumstances
of the adoptee's origin.71 For instance, if the adoptee is born in lawful wedlock, he is the legitimate issue of the blood parents. 7 2 As a "legitimate" adopt-

ed child he may inherit from all maternal and paternal blood kindred, his
adoptive parents, and his adoptive brothers and sisters.73 The adoptive
siblings, adoptive parents, and blood kindred, except for the blood parents,
are eligible to inherit from the adoptee.7 4 Thus, statutory intestate succession

licensing all child placement agencies in the state. FLA. STAT. §§63.031, .041, 409.175 (1969).
66. This provision is also a part of the proposed adoption bill. Fla. H.R. 2856 (Feb. 2,
1972).
67. FLA. STAT. §63.181 (1969). According to the FLORIDA DEP'T OF HEALTH & R mAmILITATIVE

SERvIcEs,

DIVISION

OF FAMILY

SERvIcES

ADOPTION STATISTICAL REPORT

(1970) there

were 3,296 adoptions in the state in 1970. This evinces the yearly number of court orders
necessary to reopen adoption files to effect the adoptee's succession rights within the
natural family.
68. After obtaining a court order and locating the natural family, the adoptee may
be precluded from participating in the estate of a deceased blood relative if he has not
asserted his heirship within the statute of limitations. See FLA. STAT. §§732.30, 733.211, .42,
734.03, 735.09-.11 (1969).
69. See note 60 supra. "The adoption statutes give new rights to adoptees. They do
not, however, attempt to limit or take away rights already in existence .... In re Levy's
Estate, 141 So. 2d 803, 804 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962). "The statute does not attempt to take
away an adoptee's preexisting right of inheritance from his natural parents or from his
natural kindred." Id. at 805-06.

70. FLA.

STAT.

§63.151 (1969).

71.
72.
73.
2d 904

See Appendix.
Sanders v. Yancey, 122 So. 2d 202, 205 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1960).
FLA. STAT. §§731.23, .30 (1969). See In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 13 So.
(1943).
74. FLA. STAT. §731.30 (1969). See In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 13 So. 2d 904
(1943).
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rights are indeed liberal for the legitimate adoptee who successfully obtains
knowledge of his natural parents.75 However, in 1970 fewer than ten per cent
of the adoptees in Florida were of legitimate origin.76 While three per cent
of the adoptees in 1970 were of unknown origin, the overwhelming number
were illegitimate.-,
The Illegitimate Adoptee
Although the adoption statutes are noticeably silent on the adoptee's
right to inherit from blood kindred other than the natural parents, the
statute defining the inheritance rights of an illegitimate child is explicit.
The illegitimate may inherit only from his mother and, if paternity is
properly acknowledged in writing, his father.7 8 He cannot inherit by
intestate succession from other paternal or maternal blood kindred.79 Therefore, the inheritance rights of an illegitimate adoptee are vastly different
from those of the legitimate adoptee8 - While the adopted illegitimate may
inherit only from his natural mother; his adopting parents; his adoptive
brothers and sisters; and, if acknowledged, from his natural father, those who
may inherit from such adoptee are his adoptive parents, his adoptive brothers
and sisters, and the heirs at law of his natural mother.8 1 Neither the acknowledging father nor his kindred can inherit.82 Thus, although the adoptee's
status has ostensibly been "legitimized" by the adoption decree, the adopted
illegitimate remains tainted by his origin and inherits in a manner different
from the adopted legitimate, even though both are classified as adopted
persons.8 3
The determination of the adoptee's legitimate-illegitimate status is fraught
with complexity augmented by state imposed shrouds of secrecy.8 4 Although
issue conceived and born out of wedlock are traditionally deemed illegitimate,8 5 the incidents of this status may also attach to the issue of an invalid
marriage,8 6 a marriage contracted in a foreign jurisdiction to evade domi-

75. See FLA. STAT. §§731.23, .30 (1969). See also In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137,
141, 13 So. 2d 904, 906 (1943); In re Levy's Estate, 141 So. 2d 803, 804-06 (2d D.C.A. Fla.
1962).
76. FLORIDA DEP'T OF HEALTH & REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, DIVISION OF FAMILY SERVICES
ADOPTION STATISTICAL REPORT 1 (1970).
77. Id.; 87% of the adoptees in 1970 were illegitimate.
78. FLA. STAT. §731.29 (1969).
79. Id. The constitutionality of this statute was recently upheld in In re Caldwell's
Estate, 247 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971).
80. See Appendix.
81. FLA. STAT. §§731.29, .30 (1969).
82. See FLA. STAT. §731.29(2) (1969).
83. For a discussion of the constitutionality of such classification, see text accompanying
notes 122-26 inIra.
84. See FLA. STAT. §63.181 (1969).
85. See Kennelly v. Davis, 221 So. 2d 415, 416 (Fla.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 916 (1969).
86. See Warrenberger v. Folsom, 140 F. Supp. 610, 613 (M.D. Pa. 1956) (void common
law marriage).
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ciliary laws s 7 or a bigamous marriage.8s The legitimacy of a child born in
wedlock may be repudiated by the father.89 In addition, the law of the
father's domicile is given full faith and credit in determining the legitimacy
of his issue,90 so that the status of an adoptee in Florida may be determined
by the laws of foreign jurisdictions.
The status of the adoptee may be further confused by annulment of the
natural mother's marriage. Traditionally, to protect the status of a conceived
child, an annulment decree is effective as of the time entered, not ab initio.91
At least one Florida court, however, has held rebuttable the presumption
that a child born in wedlock is legitimate and has decided that an annulment prior to the birth of the child gives the mother standing to sue to
declare the child a bastard.92
An additional problem concerns the sufficiency of the evidence required
to prove paternity.93 Florida Statutes, section 781.29, requires that the
father acknowledge his paternity in writing in the presence of a competent
witness as a condition to the right of the illegitimate child to inherit from
such natural father.9 4 Florida courts have held an informal writing, 95 a
hotel registration,9 and a letter to a college registrar 9' as sufficient indicia
of paternity. However, the inheritance rights accompanying such tenuous
examples of acknowledgment may be more accessible to the unadopted
illegitimate than to the adopted illegitimate who must contend with the
state policy of confidentiality concerning adoption records98 This secrecy
barrier may also prevent the adoptee from proving intermarriage of his

87. Peerless Pac. Co. v. Burckhard, 90 Wash. 221, 223, 155 P. 1037, 1038 (1916).
88. See FLA. STAT. §§61.041-.051 (1969). See also Irving v. Irving, 152 Ga. 174, 108
S.E. 540 (1921). The element of good faith of the parents entering into the marriage may
have a bearing on the status of their issue. Connor v. Rainwater, 200 Ga. 866, 38 S.E.2d 805
(1946). See Worman v. Worman, 113 Fla. 233, 152 So. 435, 436 (1934) (Davis, C.J., concurring). Florida lacks such legislation as found, for example, in Ohio. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §2105.18 (Page 1968). "The issue of parents whose marriage is null in law shall
nevertheless be legitimate." Id. The word "marriage" in the phrase "whose marriage is
null in law" in §2105.18 of the Ohio Code has been interpreted to mean a de facto
marriage, a purported marriage, a marital status, or an informal marriage and when such
a marriage is entered into in good faith by at least one of the parties and children are
afterwards born of that marriage, such children are legitimate regardless of the reasons
for the nullity of the marriage. Santilli v. Rosetti, 87 Ohio L. Abs. 400, 411-12, 178 N.E.2d
633, 640 (C.P. Ashtabula County (1961)).
89. Gossett v. Ullendorff, 114 Fla. 159, 169, 154 So. 177, 181 (Fla. 1934).
90. Peterson v. Paoli, 44 So. 2d 639, 640 (Fla. 1950); Young v. Garcia, 172 So. 2d 243,
244 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1965).
91. In re Rugg's Estate, 159 Fla. 777, 781, 32 So. 2d 840, 842 (1947).
92. See B.S.B. v. B.S.F., 217 So. 2d 599, 600 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969).
93. See FLA. STAT. §731.29 (1969). Proof of paternity, however, does not enable the illegitimate adoptee to inherit from any other paternal blood kindred. See Appendix.
94. FLA. STAT. §731.29 (1) (1969).
95. In re McCollum's Estate, 88 So. 2d 537, 540 (Fla. 1956).
96. Wall v. Altobello, 49 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1950).
97. In re Home's Estate, 149 Fla. 710, 713-14, 719-20, 7 So. 2d 13, 14, 16 (1942).
98. See text accompanying notes 59-69 supra.
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natural parents, which by statute has the effect of "instant legitimization"
of his status. 99

Artificial Insemination Adoptee
The problems inherent in utilizing the legitimate-illegitimate criterion
to determine adoptee intestate succession rights become more complex upon
consideration of the impact of artificial insemination on standards of legitimacy and illegitimacy.100 Here the facts of conception as well as birth are
determinative. The desire for secrecy precludes precise data on the current
use of artificial insemination. However, its growing popularity is indicated
by estimates that up to 250,000 humans living today are the product of this
process.10 1 In spite of growing public acceptance and the novel legal questions raised, 0 2 there have been very few successful attempts to deal with the
problem through legislative means. 10 3 Florida presently has no legislation
defining the rights and status of issue conceived through the process of
artificial insemination. If the inheritance rights of an adoptee continue to
be tied to the circumstances of birth, such status must be legislatively de0 4
termined.
Although Florida has not defined the status of artificial insemination
issue, there are sufficient decisions from other jurisdictions to formulate the
probable legal consequences of this process on the intestate succession rights
of the Florida adoptee. There are three types of artificial insemination: (1)
artificial insemination husband (AIH), (2) artificial insemination donor
(AID), and (3) combined artificial insemination (CAI). 10 5 Because the AIH

99.

See FLA. STAT. §731.29 (1) (1969).

100. Artificial insemination appears to have occurred as early as 1322 when used by
Arabs to selectively breed their horses and impregnate the horses of their enemies with an
inferior strain. Smith, Through a Test Tube Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the
Law, 67 MIcH. L. REV. 127, 128 (1968).
101. Id. at 133. It has been estimated that one out of every ten couples in the United
States cannot conceive offspring in the usual manner. Of the reported cases of infertility, approximately 40% is due to the husband's sterility. Note, Human Artificial Insemination: An Analysis and Proposal for Florida, 22 U. MIAIri L. REV. 952, 954 (1968).
102. Legal questions such as the effect of artificial insemination on the legitimacy of
the child; the problem of incest and intermarriage, since the donor is kept secret; and
the effect of this process on paternity actions are as yet unanswered. Further, since sperm
may be stored safely for eight to eighteen years before being used in this process, the
Rule Against Perpetuities may have to be renovated. See generally The St. Petersburg
(Fla.) Times, Oct. 31, 1971, §A at 16, col. 3.
103. For a brief summary of legislative bills see Smith, supra note 100, at 143 n.86.
Although the Oklahoma Legislature was the first to pass a statute on this subject, OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§551-53 (Supp. 1971), two other states have followed suit. See CAL.
Civ. CoDE §216 (West 1970); KAN. STAT. §23.128-.130 (1969).

104. Since Genetics Laboratories, Inc., a sperm bank laboratory chain, is opening an
office in Miami, Florida, this problem must be faced in the near future. See The St.
Petersburg (Fla.) Times, Oct. 31, 1971, §A at 16, col. 1.
105. Artificial Insemination Husband or homologous insemination (AIH), the husband
is donor of the semen; semen from a donor other than the husband is used in Artificial
Insemination Donor or heterologous insemination (AID); and Combined Artificial In-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol24/iss4/1

14

1972]

Smith and Fawsett: Florida Adoption and Intestate Succesion Laws: A Legal Paralogism
FLORIDA ADOPTION AND INTESTATE SUCCESSION LAWS

(husband donor) child is produced through the union of the sperm and
egg of the natural
(married) parents, such child would probably be deemed
"legitimate," 1' 0 6 and if subsequently adopted by a third person would have
the inheritance rights of a legitimate adoptee 107 On the other hand, the
AID (non-husband donor) child has generally been held to be illegitimate,
even if impregnation of the mother was made with the consent of her husband.108
The foundation for the American approach to artificial insemination
was established by a Canadian case, Orford v. Orford.'0 9 In this decision
the court held that AID (non-husband donor) without the husband's consent is adultery and therefore a sufficient basis for divorce.-O Nearly thirty
years later in Strnad v. Strnad,1" an American court held that a child resulting from AID (non-husband donor), with the consent of the husband,
was not illegitimate but pointedly refused to determine the property rights
of such child.112 In Strnad the child's status was further confused by the
court's holding that the child had been "semi-adopted" by the consenting
husband." 3 While the basis for the Sirnad holding is unclear, it is an ex-

semination (CAI) involves the mixing of the semen of the husband and donor. Note,
supra note 101, at 952-53.
106. Plowscowe, The Place of Law in Medico-Moral Problems: A Legal View 11, 31
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1238, 1242 (1956).
107. See Appendix. However, there is at least one English decision to the contrary. L.
v. L., I All. E.R. 141 (1949). In this case, a couple whose marriage was never consummated
agreed to undergo the AIH process for one year. The couple later separated without
knowing of the wife's pregnancy. The English court held the child was not the result of
a normal sexual consummation and was therefore illegitimate. Id. at 143-44, 146. See
Smith, supra note 100, at 135; Note, Artificial Insemination, 30 BROOKLYN L. R.v. 302, 315
(1964).
108. Smith, supra note 100, at 136; Note, supra note 101, at 958. However, the three
states with legislation on this subject have made legitimate the issue by artificial insemination if the spouse consents in writing to such impregnation. See CAL. Crv. CODE §216 (West
1970); KAN. STAT. §§23.128-.130 (1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§551-53 (Supp. 1971).
California not only requires consent in writing by the spouse but also requires that the
issue be born during the marriage or within 300 days after dissolution of the marriage
before such issue shall be deemed legitimate. CAL. CIv. CODE §216 (West 1970).
109. 49 Ont. L.R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
110. Id. at 22-23, 58 D.L.R. at 258-59. "In the Orford case . .. AID was declared to be
an act of adultery, and it is almost certain that if such was the basis of the decision, the
court would have declared the child illegitimate." Note, supra note 107, at 313. However,
in a 1945 case, Hoch v. Hoch, AID without the husband's consent was held not to be
adultery. Ter, Feb. 26, 1945, at 58, col. 1. Although Hoch appears to be the first American
(Cook County, Il.) case on the subject, it was not officially reported and has not been
precedential in the United States. Smith, supra note 100, at 135-36.
111. 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
112. Id. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 392.
113. Id. The court stated: "The situation is no different than that pertaining in the
case of a child born out of wedlock who by law is made legitimate upon the marriage
of the interested parties." Id. Under Florida law, such child would be legitimated only
by intermarriage of the mother and the natural father. See FLA. STAT. §731.29 (1969). For
the inheritance right of the adoptee if Florida adhered to the Strnad semi-adoption theory

see Appendix.
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ception to the general American approach that the absence of a statute
classifies the AID (non-husband donor) child, whether conceived with or
1 14
without the husband's consent, as illegitimate.
In the area of artificial insemination the presumption that a child born
in wedlock is legitimate appears to be inapplicable," 5 and the law generally
looks upon the donor of the semen as the natural father.116 This view is
upheld even though the donor's identity is usually unknown."17 Finally,
while statutes on human artificial insemination make such issue legitimate
only if the spouse consents in writingy 8 in the absence of statutes such issue
are generally deemed illegitimate, regardless of the spouse's consent.""
The present Florida intestate succession rights of the adoptee are completely inadequate in the case of artificial insemination. Since there is no
Florida statute in this area, the courts must answer the following questions:
(1) Is the issue of artificial insemination illegitimate: (a) regardless
of the spouse's consent, or (b) if such consent is not in writing?
(2) Is the issue of artificial insemination legitimate: (a) on the
basis of the Strnad "semi-adoption" theory"20 or (b) on the basis of the
21
spouse's consent or acknowledgment?"

114. E.g., Gurskey v. Gurskey, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963); see
Comment, Domestic Relations- Heterologous Artificial Insemination, With or Without
the Consent of the Husband, Constitutes Adultery on the Part of the Mother, and the
Child so Conceived Is Illegitimate, 43 GEO. L.J. 517 (1955).
115. Smith, supra note 100, at 136. In a recent criminal case, People v. Sorensen, 68
Cal. 2d 280, 437 P.2d 495, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1968), the court recognized the impossibility
of locating the "natural father" of an AID child and charged the "lawful father" who
had consented to AID with child support. To support this holding the court used a
combination of contract theory, public policy, presumption of legitimacy, and a California
statute requiring the parent to support both legitimate and illegitimate offspring.
Although, in dicta, the court emphasized the lack of logic in stigmatizing an artificially
inseminated child as illegitimate, it called upon the legislature to make this determination.
Id. at 284-89, 437 P.2d at 498-502, 66 Cal. Rptr. at 10-14. See also CAL. Civ. CODE §216

(WSr 1970).
The parties to the suit may of course stipulate the child was artificially conceived.
Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948). In the absence of legislation, however, the paternity of the child appearing on the birth certificate poses a dilemma
for the attending physician. If he enters the name of the husband as father, the physician
subjects himself to penalties for perjury and falsifying a public record. However, stating
the name of the real donor is disapproved by the medical profession. Symposium on
Artificial Insemination, 7 SYRACUSE L. RaV. 96, 113 (1955). Some courts merely require
competent evidence to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. See People v. Sorensen, 68 Cal.
2d 280, 286, 289, 437 P.2d 495, 499-500, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10-11 (1968) (burden on defendant);
B.S.B. v. B.S.F., 217 So. 2d 599 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1969) (burden on plaintiff).
116. Smith, supra note 100 at 132; Symposium, supra note 115, at 111; Contra, People
v. Sorensen, 68 Cal. 2d 280, 284, 437 P.2d 495, 498, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7, 10 (1968).
117. Note, supra note 101, at 956-58.
118. See note 108 supra.
119. See text accompanying notes 112-116 supra.
120. See Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
121. This would be a form of contract theory. Since a child is not legitimated pursuant to Florida Statutes, §731.29, unless the husband acknowledges himself to be the
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Until the legislature reevaluates adoptee status and intestate succession
rights, the adoptee must bear an inordinate burden of proof of such facts of
conception as consent of mother's spouse to artificial insemination, consent
in writing, and type of artificial insemination employed. The adoptee will
also bear the burden to prove intermarriage of his parents, validity of the
marriage, acknowledgment of the father, sufficiency of acknowledgment,
effective date of annulment decree or effective law of the father's domicile.
Such fine lines between legitimacy and illegitimacy become gossamer threads
when adoption proceedings are impressed with secrecy. The complexities
inherent in this approach are illogical and inequitable. Further, since it is a
basic constitutional proposition that all persons similarly situated shall be
treated equally by the law, 122 the Florida approach may violate the equal
protection clause. 123 Creating a legal classification based on adoption and
limiting some members within that class to the inheritance rights of illegitimates, while affording others similarly situated the inheritance rights of
legitimates, appears to be an arbitrary and unnecessary discriminatory practice.24

For these reasons limitations on intestate inheritance based on blood
relationships should have no application in the area of adoption. The adoptee
should not be penalized for his origin, and Florida should join the ranks
of the enlightened majority. In summary, the present adoption and succession laws should be legislatively revised to expressly make the status of the
adoptee legitimate, to place him within the adoptive family for all purposes
25
including inheritance, as a child born in wedlock to his adoptive parents,
and to sever forever his relationship through inheritance with his blood
kindred.126
Related Problems
The judicial approach in Florida to adoption and intestate succession
has left unresolved various important legal issues. For instance, because the
father, a new statute would be required to employ the Strnad reasoning in Florida.
122. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 333 (1921); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Coachman,
59 Fla. 130, 137, 52 So. 377, 380 (1910).
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §1. See also FLA. CONsT. art. I, §2.
124. See Cunningham v. United States, 256 F.2d 467, 473 (5th Cir. 1958); Battaglia v.
Adams, 164 So. 2d 195, 198-99 (Fla. 1964); Davis v. Florida Power Co., 64 Fla. 246, 266-67,
60 So. 759, 766 (1913); Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 552-53, 47 So. 1001,
1003 (1908). The constitutionality of inheritance rights of unadopted illegitimates is beyond the scope of this note. See In re Caldwell's Estate, 247 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1971) (statute
constitutional); In re Jensen's Estate, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968) (statute unconstitutional).
125. See Schick v. Howe, 137 Iowa 249, 114 N.W. 916 (1908); Vreeland v. Vreeland,
296 S.W.2d 55 (Mo. 1956).
126. In Gessner v. Powell the court held that an adopted child may not maintain
a wrongful death action for his natural father. The court distinguished In re Levy's
Estate, 141 So. 2d 803 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962), as applying only to the inheritance rights of

an adoptee. The court also stated that in all other respects the relation between the
natural parents and the adopted child is severed. Gessner v. Powell, 238 So. 2d 101, 102
(Fla. 1970).
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succession rights between the adoptee and the natural family are not severed,
the adoptee, if adopted by a blood relative, may inherit dual portions from
a deceased relative. 12 7 As an example, assume a grandmother, after adopting

X, one of the children of her deceased daughter, died intestate. The adopted
child is the lineal descendant of the adopting parent 128 and inherits the
estate of his blood parent." -9 The child also represents the latter parent
in taking from the estate of a lineal ancestor. 1 0 Therefore, under Florida
law it could be argued that X would receive Y2 of the decedent's estate as her
adopted child and also receive '4 of the decedent's estate as representative
of his natural mother. Thus, X would inherit % of the estate while the other
child would inherit 4.131 Such dual inheritance would be precluded by
making the adoptee the child of the adopting parent(s) for all purposes, including inheritance from adoptive lineal and collateral kindred, and completely severing the adoptee's ties within the natural family as issue of his
blood parents.
Second, the adoption statutes are vague as to inheritance rights when the
adoptee is readopted. For instance, suppose C is adopted by A and B.
Subsequent to this proceeding, these adoptive parents die or become incapacitated and C is readopted by X and Y. According to Florida Statutes,
32
section 731.30, "the adopting parents shall inherit from the adopted child."'
But according to Florida Statutes, section 63.151:1'3
When an adopted child has been subsequently adopted by some third
party . . . the adopted child shall not inherit from an adopted parent
when he has been subsequently adopted . . . in the absence of some

evidence in writing that the adopting parent considered the child his
child for the purposes of inheritance notwithstanding the subsequent
adoption.
Thus, the statutes do not terminate the prior adopting parents' right to participate in the estate of their adopted child who is subsequently adopted
by others, although the adoptee may not be able to share in the estate of his
prior adopting parents.
Further, Florida law is unclear as to the relation of the child to his
natural parents when an adopting parent intermarries with one of the
natural parents. For instance, suppose A and B had a child, C. Later A and

B were divorced and their natural child C was adopted by X and Y. After

127. See In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 140-42, 13 So. 2d 904, 906-07 (1943); FLA.
STAT. §731.30 (1969).
128. FLA. STAT. §731.30 (1969).
129. Id. See FLA. STAT. §63.151 (1969).
130. FLA. STAT. §731.23 (1969).

131. See Wagner v. Varner, 50 Iowa 532 (1879); In re Benner's Estate, 109 Utah 172,
166 P.2d 257 (1946). Contra, Delano v. Bruerton, 148 Mass. 619, 20 N.E. 308 (1889);
Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Palms, 360 Mo. 610, 229 S.W.2d 675 (1950).
132.
133.

FLA. STAT. §731.30 (1969).
FLA. STAT. §63.151 (1969).
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several years X dies and Y marries A, the natural mother of C. According
to section 731.30: "The adopted child shall inherit the estate of his blood
134
parents, but his blood parents shall not inherit from the adopted child."'
However, section 63.151 provides: "[W]hen the adopting parent is married
to one of the natural parents of the child or thereafter intermarries with one
of the natural parents, the relation of the child toward the natural parents
is not altered by the adoption."IL Does this mean that B, the natural father,
as well as A may now participate in the estate of C? While this is unlikely,
the statute is uncertain in its language.
Finally, the present Florida adoption laws in conjunction with the pretermitted child statute-8 may have the effect of disrupting descent and
distribution of the natural parent's estate. For instance, suppose A, an unmarried female adult, made a valid will in 1950 leaving her entire estate to
her mother without providing for after-born children. In 1955, A had an
illegitimate child that at birth was placed with an adoption agency and
adopted by X and Y, both of whom had formerly made wills leaving their
respective estates to each other. Fifteen years later A dies, and X and Y die
simultaneously. Pursuant to Florida Statutes, section 731.11:137
When a testator omits to provide in his will for any of his children
born after the making of the will .. .such child shall receive a share
in the estate of the testator equal in value to that which he would have
received if the testator had died intestate.
Unless such omission appears from the will to be intentional,'3 the child
born to or subsequently adopted by the testator"19 has the right to participate in the testator's estate as an intestate successor despite the provisions
of the will.140 Thus, under present law C would inherit both A's entire
estate and the entire estates of X and Y. The mother of A would receive
nothing, despite being the sole beneficiary under A's will.' 14 Therefore, the
adoptee may be the pretermitted child of both the natural and adopting
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.
FLA. STAT.

§731.30 (1969).

§63.151 (1969) (emphasis added).
§731.11 (1969).
Id.; see FLA. STAT. §731.23 (1969).
FLA. STAT. §731.11 (1969).
Id.; In re Frizzell's Estate, 156 So. 2d 558 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963).
In re Frizell's Estate, 156 So. 2d 558 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1963); FLA.

STAT.

§731.11

(1969).
141. A fifth problem does not pertain to Florida alone. This is the need for a national
Uniform Adoption Act delineating the status and intestate succession rights of the adoptee.
Although there is incongruity among state adoption statutes, the status conferred by a
foreign state is recognized under the rules of comity and full faith and credit. However,
a foreign power may not attach incidents to this status, which differ from the laws or
policy of the local forum. Mott v. First Nat'l Bank, 98 Fla. 444, 447-48, 124 So. 2d 36, 37
(1929), rev'd on other grounds, 101 Fla. 1224, 133 So. 78 (1931); Tsilidis v. Pedakis, 132 So.
2d 9, 12 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1961). Thus, a child adopted in a state such as California or
Ohio, in which the adoptee's status is that of a natural child born within the adoptive
family, would be deprived in Florida of the full range of inheritance rights incident to this
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parents. This disruptment of testate succession would be alleviated by severing the adoptee's relationship with the natural parents.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The present Florida adoption and intestate succession laws are unfair,
unnecessarily complex, and contrary to legislative intent. By tying the
adoptee to his natural family and the circumstances of his origin, Florida
law places the burden on the adoptee to prove his former legitimate or
illegitimate status in order to perfect statutory inheritance rights. Concomitantly this information has been placed under a statutory lock. 142 Not
only does this secrecy lead to increased litigation, but it may also prevent
the adoptee from asserting his inheritance rights within the statutes of
limitations. Since there is no Florida law on artificial insemination, the
inheritance rights of an adoptee may fall into one of three classifications:
those of a legitimate, an illegitimate, or a hybrid legitimate-illegitimate. The
complexities inherent in such treatment of members similarly situated
within the same classification are unreasonable and may violate the principle
of equal protection of the law. In addition, the present Florida laws do not
clearly delineate the procedures for dual inheritance or the aspects of subsequent adoptions or inheritance rights following intermarriage of the
adopting and natural parents. Finally, by maintaining the adoptee's ties
with the natural family, there is danger of disrupting the testamentary succession pattern of the natural parent's estate.
Therefore, the Florida Legislature should act to remove any doubt that
the adoptee is "the child and legal heir of the adopting parent or parents,
entitled to all rights and privileges, and subject to all obligations of a child
born to such parent or parents in lawful wedlock." 143 Since it is state policy
to promote adoptions, 4 4 Florida should join the ranks of the majority of
jurisdictions by placing the adoptee within the adoptive family for all purposes including inheritance by, from, and through his adoptive lineal and
collateral kindred. 145 The status of the adoptee should be that of a legitimate
person, and his intestate succession rights should be limited to those inheritance rights of his adoptive parents' natural issue in order to preclude dual
succession. Not only should the intestate inheritance relationship with the
natural parents and their kindred be severed, but there should be no intestate rights by virtue of adoption between the adoptee and a prior adoptive
family when such adoptee has subsequently been adopted by a third party. 46
foreign status. See In re Hewett's Estate, 153 Fla. 137, 13 So. 2d. 904 (1943). See also OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §60.1-.23 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1971).
142. See FLA. STAT. §63.181 (1969).
143. FLA. STAT. §63.151 (1969).
144. FLA. STAT. §63.011 (1969); Note, The Effect of Common Law Rights of Parents
on Adoption in Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 452, 462 (1963).
145. "It is as competent for the legislature to place a child by adoption in the direct
line of descent as for the common law to place a child by birth there." Warren v. Prescott,
84 Me. 483, 487, 24 A. 948, 949 (1892).
146. If any member of the adoptee's natural family or prior adopted family wishes to
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To achieve this result, the authors recommend that Florida Statutes, sections 63.151, 63.281, and 731.30, be repealed and the following statute be
enacted:
Effect of Adoption. Upon entry of the adoption decree, the adoptee
shall be the legitimate child and heir of the adopting parent or parents,
subject to all the rights, privileges, duties, and obligations of a child
born to such parent or parents in lawful wedlock. Inheritance shall
be by, from and through the adoptee and the lineal and collateral
kindred of the adoptive family. Upon adoption, the relationship between the adoptee and any natural parent against whom the adoption
decree operates, and kindred thereof, shall be severed. Neither the
natural parent nor kindred of the natural parent shall succeed to the
estate of the adoptee. The adoptee shall not succeed to the estate of
the natural parent or kindred of the natural parent. However, if an
adopting parent subsequently intermarries with a natural parent
against whom the adoption decree operated, and said natural parent
adopts the adoptee, there shall be inheritance by, from and through
said natural parent, the kindred of said natural parent and the
adoptee. Any subsequent adoption alters legal rights with respect to
the former adoptive family to the same extent that an initial adoption
alters legal rights with respect to the adoptee's natural family. Nothing
contained herein shall be construed to limit the right of any person
47
to make a will.
make the adoptee an heir, a will to this effect may be made. See In re Dolan's Estate,
169 Cal. App. 2d 628, 337 P.2d 498 (3d Dist. Ct. App. 1959); Wailes v. Curators of Central
College, 363 Mo. 932, 254 S.W.2d 645 (1953); Nickell v. Gall, 49 N.J. 186, 229 A.2d 511 (1967).
147. The bill that had been prefiled in the Florida House of Representatives proposed
to amend F.A. STAT. §731.30 (1969) as follows: "731.30 Adopted Child. An adopted child,
whether adopted under the laws of Florida or of any other state or country, shall be an
heir at law, and for the purpose of inheritance, shall be regarded as a lineal descendant of
his adopting parents, and the adopting parents shall inherit from the adopted child. The
adopted child shall be regarded as the natural brother or sister of the natural children of
the adopting parents for the purpose of inheritance from or by them." Fla. H.R. 2856
(Feb. 2, 1972). This amendment would leave inheritance between the adoptee and the
adoptive family restricted to only inheritance by and from the adoptee, the adoptive siblings,
and the adoptive parents. Florida thus would continue to adhere to the minority view.
See text accompanying notes 36-57 supra.
However, a committee (on Health and Rehabilitative Services) substitute for Fla. H.R.
2856 died on the House calendar during the 1972 legislative session.
(a) Unless acknowledged by the natural father or the natural parents intermarry, the
illegitimate adoptee does not inherit from the natural father. FLA. STAT. §731.29 (1969).
(b) Pursuant to FLA. STAT. §63.151 (1969), an adoptee who is subsequently re-adopted
does not inherit from the first adopting parent unless specified otherwise in writing. Thus,
under Strnad, the spouse of the child's natural mother would be deemed the first adoptive
parent. See Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
(c) Inheritance from the natural kindred of the child's mother would depend on whether
the child was deemed "legitimate" under the Strnad theory. While the Strnad court stressed
the child was not illegitimate, it dearly refused to clarify the child's status. Strnad v.
Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d 890, 392 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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